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THE DESTRUCTIBILITY OF CONTINGENT
REMAINDERS IN NORTH CAROLINA
FREDERICK B. MCCALL*
North Carolina, perhaps to a greater extent than any other state,
has preserved intact in its real property law many of the rules and
doctrines of the common law which it inherited from England. Some
of these bear upon their faces the unmistakable imprint of the feudal
system. The Rule in Shelley's Case-that "Gothic column found among
the remains of feudality"--; the estate by the entirety; dower and
curtesy; a statute of descents that still talks in terms of "the blood of
the first purchaser" and bears a striking similarity to the Canons of
Descent as set forth by Blackstone; the non-assignability of contingent
rights of re-entry-these, to mention a few, have grown to a ripe
and active old age in our law, respectfully unscathed by the legislative
hand. Nor has North Carolina enacted any legislation expressly pre-
serving from destructibility contingent remainders. It is our purpose
to determine to what extent, if at all, the andent common law doctrine
of destructibility still obtains in this state. Is it still a part of our real
property law, or has it fallen upon evil days as a result of judicial
decisions which have boldly rejected it, or by virtue of statutes, which,
though not directly leveled against it, have had the effect of emasculat-
ing it?
For a clearer understanding of the problem perhaps it would be well
first to indicate the nature of a remainder and the distinction which
our court has drawn between vested and contingent remainders. An
estate in remainder is an estate limited to take effect in possession im-
mediately after the expiration of a prior estate created at the same time
and by the same instrument.1 In distinguishing between a vested and
a contingent remainder our court relies upon and quotes freely from
Fearne on Contingent Remainders, as follows: "That wherever the
preceding estate is limited, so as to determine on an event which cer-
tainly must happen, and the remainder is so limited to a person in esse
and ascertained, that the preceding estate may, by any means, determine
before the expiration of the estate limited in remainder, such remainder
is vested. On the contrary, wherever the preceding estate (except in
the instances noted . . .) is limited, so as to determine only on an
event which is uncertain and may never happen, or wherever the
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
' Carolina Power Co. v. Haywood, 186 N. C. 313, 317, 119 S. E. 500, 502
(1923).
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remainder is limited to a person not in esse or not ascertained, or
wherever it is limited so as to require the concurrence of some dubious,
uncertain event, independent of the determination of the preceding
estate and duration of the estate limited in remainder to give it a
capacity of taking effect, then the remainder is contingent.... It is not
the uncertainty of ever taking effect in possession that makes a re-
mainder contingent; for to that, every remainder for life or in tail
is and must be liable; as the remainderman may die, or die without
issue before the death of the tenant for life. The present capacity
of taking effect in possession, if the possession were to become vacant,
and not the certainty that the possession will become vacant before the
estate limited in remainder determines, universally distinguishes a
vested remainder from one that is contingent."12  In the celebrated
case of Starnes v'. Hill,3 the court said: "We return to the rule as
laid down by Fearne. This may be illustrated by a limitation to A for
life, and then to B for life. Now here B may die before A, in which
event he would never actually enjoy the possession; but during his life
he has a fixed right of future enjoyment, which, upon the determination
of A's estate, whether by death or otherwise, entitles him to the imme-
diate possession, irrespective of the concurrence of any collateral con-
tingency, and his remainder is therefore vested. In other words, the
term 'vested remainder' imports, ex vi termini, 'a present title' in the
remainderman. So that, if the limitation in the above illustration had
been to B and his heirs, the latter would have taken, although B had
died before A. In Gray, Perp. 63, the learned author thus distinguishes
a vested from a contingent remainder: 'A remainder is vested in A
when, throughout its continuance, A or A and his heirs have the right
to the immediate possession whenever and however the preceding estates
determine; or, in other words a remainder is vested, if so long as it lasts,
the only obstacle to the right of immediate possession by the remainder-
man is the existence of the preceding estates; or again, a remainder is
vested if it is subject to no condition precedent save the determination
of the preceding estates.' 4 Tiffany says that "a contingent remainder
is merely the possibility or prospect of an estate, which exists when
what would otherwise be a vested remainder is subject to a condition
precedent, or is created in favor of an uncertain person or persons."6
This statement, in effect, epitomizes the view of the North Carolina
'Ibid., citing and quoting from 1 FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (1845)
216, 217.8112 N. C. 1, 9, 16 S. E. 1011, 1013 (1893).
'To the same effect, see also Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N. C. 705, 68 S. E.
217 (1910), in vhich case the court accepts Fearne's classification of contingent
remainders. 1 FEANuE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (1845) 5.81 TIFFANY, REAr, PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §136.
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court as to the general nature of the contingent remainder.5' An
example of a contingent remainder in favor of an ascertained person,
that is, a remainder subject to a condition precedent other than the
ascertainment of the remainderman may be found in the case of Brown
v. Guthery,6 where the testator devised lands to his wife, Katie, for life,
and upon her death to his son, Charles, if he be alive, or to his heirs,
if he be dead. The court held that Charles took a contingent remainder,
since he took no estate under the will until the happening of the event
provided therein for the vesting of such estate, to-wit, his survival of the
life tenant. To illustrate the contingency of a.'remainder created in
favor of an uncertain person or persons, we call attention to the case
of Young V. Young,7 where lands were conveyed in trust for the use of
Jane for life, and at her death for the use of her children then living.
The court held the remainder to the children to be contingent since it
was impossible to tell who would be entitled to take until the life tenant
died.
According to Fearne, it was a rule of the common law that a legal
remainder must vest either during the existence of the particular estate,
or at the very instant of its determination, otherwise it would never
take effect at all. Consequently, a contingent remainder was destroyed
by the determination of the preceding estate before the event happened
upon which the remainder depended for its vesting 8 In other words,
if A conveyed Whiteacre to B for life, remainder to C and his heirs
if C married D, the remainder would fail unless it vested (that is,
unless C married D) at or before the termination of B's life estate.
This doctrine whereby C's contingent remainder might be defeated by
its failure to become vested within a serviceable period-the duration of
the preceding particular estate-was called the destructibility rule.
Without stopping at this point to enumerate the various ways in which
at common law contingent remainders could be destroyed, we pass on to
a brief consideration of the reasons which gave rise to the rule of
destructibility.
Like many other rules of the common law governing land titles, the
doctrine of destructibility lies deeply rooted in the feudal concept of
seisin, The feudal economy required that at all times there should be
some person seized of an estate of freehold in a particular tract of land
against whom an action concerning the land could be brought, who
"* Mercer v. Downs, 191 N. C. 203, 131 S. E. 575 (1926) quoting from 1 TIF-
FANY, REAI, PRoPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §136.I 190 N. C. 822, 130 S. E. 836 (1925).
797 N. C. 132, 2 S. E. 8 (1887). See also Corl v. Corl, 209 N. C. 7, 182 S. E.
725 (1935) in which the testator devised certain property to B for life, and in
the event he should marry and have legitimate children, the remainder after his
death to go to said legitimate children. The children took a contingent remainder.
'1 FEARNE CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (1845) 316.
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could meet adverse claims thereto, and who could render the feudal
services to the lord.9 The seisin-the possession of a freehold estate-
could never be in abeyance, and any act which would have the effect of
leaving the freehold without a tenant was void. In addition to the
feudal requirement just indicated, another factor played a large part
in determining the rule of destructibility. According to the common
law, the only way in which an estate of freehold could be created in
favor of a grantee was by livery of seisin-the actual delivery of the
feudal possession of the land by the grantor or feoffor. This was a
present act effective immediately or not at all and led to the rule that
"there could be no conveyance of an estate of freehold to commence
in the future, that is, subject to a condition precedent, and that any such
attempted conveyance was void."10 The creation of a vested remainder
did not violate this rule. For instance, if A, owning a fee simple
estate in Blackacre, wished to convey to B for life, remainder to C
and his heirs, he delivered the seisin to B, the holder of the particular
estate, who held it not only for himself during his life estate but also for
C, the vested remainderman. Whenever and however B's estate termi-
nated, the seisin (the right to immediate possession of the freehold)
would shift to C who had theretofore been owner of an existent estate
in Blackacre, "a fixed right of future enjoyment". 1 C's vested re-
mainder was perfectly good because there had been a present delivery
of the seisin, the remainderman had participated therein, and at the
termination of the particular estate a freeholder was ready to step in
and take possession of the land with no break in the continuity of the
seisin.
The contingent remainder, however, being only a possibility or
prospect of an estate because subject to a condition precedent or created
in favor of an uncertain person or persons,12 may not perchance become
vested during the continuance of the preceding particular estate and
may thus run afoul not only of the rule that there can be no break
in the continuity of the seisin but also of the rule prohibiting the
creation of an estate of freehold to commence in the future. Tiffany
points out that, since in their creation contingent remainders did involve
a violation of the latter rule, "it was no doubt for this reason that such
remainders were for a long time not recognized by the courts."1
About 1450, however, the courts began to recognize the validity of a
contingent remainder if at the time of its creation it was supported by
a particular estate of freehold and there was a chance of it becoming
'1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §140.
Ibid.
"See note 3, supra. "1 See note 5, supra.
"See note 9, supra.
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
vested in interest either during the existence of the particular estate or
at the very instant of the terminition thereof. In other words if the
continuity of the seisin could be preserved, the requirements of the
feudal economy were satisfied. Thus, if A, owning Blackacre in fee
simple, should wish to convey it to B for life, remainder to the heirs of
C (a living person), A would deliver the seisin to B who held it both
for himself and for the contingent remaindermen, the heirs of C, if and
when they should become entitled upon the death of C.14 This would
satisfy the common law conveyancing requirement that there be a
presently effective delivery of the seisin. Now if C sholld die during
the life of B, then C's heirs would become definitely ascertained per-
sons and their remainder therefore vested; upon the death of B the sei-
sin, without any gap therein, would pass directly to them. Thus the
continuity requirement would be met. On the other hand if C should
survive B, C's heirs would yet be unascertained and, of course, their re-
mainder not vested. The seisin of B must pass to someone; it could not
be in abeyance. C's heirs, as yet having only a possibility of an estate,
were not entitled to it; therefore the seisin would return to A the
grantor, or his heirs, by virtue of his reversion and the contingent re-
mainder would be destroyed. The subsequent death of C would not
enable his heirs to take. The seisin could not jump automatically from
A: that would involve a violation of the rule against livery of seisin, to
create a freehold estate, taking effect in fzaturo. Only by a new convey-
ance from the grantor or his heirs could C's heirs take an estate in
Blackacre. On the same basis, if the remainder had been limited to C
and his heirs provided C marry D and C had not married D during B's
life or at the instant of its termination, C's contingent remainder would
have been irrevocably destroyed. Upon the foregoing feudal concepts
of seisin and its transfer depended the common law rule of destructi-
bility of a contingent remainder--that it must vest during the preceding
particular estate or eo instante it terminated, otherwise it would fail
completely.
In the illustrations just given we have indicated how at common law
contingent remainders might be destroyed by the natural termination of
the particular estate before the happening of the contingency upon
which the remainder should become vested. It was also possible for the
contingent remainder to be defeated by the premature destruction of the
"If, however, in the illustration given, A had limited the estate to B for 10
years, remainder to tlhe heirs of C, the remainder would have been void ab initio;
since B holding only an estate for years-less than a freehold-could not receive
the seisin, and the heirs of C with only a possibility of an estate were not yet en-
titled to it and it could not take effect in them it futuro even if C died during
B's estate for years. -Hence the common law rule that a contingent remainder of
freehold must always be supported by a particular estate of freehold or be void
in its inception.
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particular estate by the holder thereof or as a result of legal conse-
quences flowing from the acts of others. The contingent remainder
therefore could be destroyed by the natural termination of the particular
estate; or prematurely, (1) by tortious alienation, (2) by forfeiture,
(3) by surrender, (4) by merger, (5) by disseisin and the change of the
right of entry in the disseisee to a right of action in him,15 and (6) by
the life tenant's renunciation of his interest.
By an examination of the North Carolina decisions and statutes we
shall now attempt to discover to what extent, if at all, contingent re-
mainders are still destructible16 in this state on the bases just described.
By Natural Termination of Preceding Freehold
At least two cases have been found in which the North Carolina
court held that a remainder which had not become vested at the normal
termination of the preceding particular estate was destroyed. Both of
them are old cases. In Chessun v. Smith 7 decided in 1816, the testa-
tor devised lands "unto [B] ... to him and his heirs of his body, law-
fully begotten; and for want of such," to the heirs of M (a living per-
son). B died without issue in 1777 or 1778; M died in 1800 without
ever having had any children. Her collateral heirs, claiming title under
the clause in the will, above set out, brought ejectment to recover the
lands from other claimants not identified in the report of the case. The
court held for the defendants, saying in part: "The remainder is not
limited to any definite person, but merely to those, who upon the death
of [M], should be her heirs. It is limited, also, upon an estate tail, a
particular freehold estate capable of supporting a contingent remainder.
The ulterior termination must therefore be construed a contingent re-
mainder, which could only become vested in the event of [M] dying and
leaving heirs, during the continuance of the estate tail. This expired in
1777 or 1778 by the death of [B] without issue. [M] survived him by
upwards of twenty years; so that the remainder to her heirs could never
vest in them." The problem presented by this particular case could not
arise under the present North Carolina law. Since by statute18 every
'CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY 135; See also Corl v. Corl, 209 N. C. 7, 182 S. E.
725 (1935).I Unquestionably North Carolina absbrbed into its jurisprudence, and recog-
nized, the common law doctrine of destructibility. Accord: King v. Rhew, 108
N. C. 696, 13 S. E. 174 (1891); Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. 1011 (1893);
"Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N. C. 705, 68 S. E. 217 (1910); Carolina Power
Co. v. Haywood, 186 N. C. 313, 119 S. E. 500 (1923) ; and other cases cited and
discussed in this article. See also, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §970, where,
in general, the common law is declared .to be in force.
274 N. C. 274.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1734. This statute was passed in 1784
and, in one of its aspects, operated retroactively to 1777 to bar the entails by
virtue of a conveyance made since that time by the tenant in tail to a bona fide
purchaser for value.
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fee tail estate is converted into a fee simple, B would now take a fee
simple, defeasible upon his dying without issue surviving him, and the
heirs of M would take an indestructible executory devise.' 9
In Flora v. Wilson,2 0 decided in 1852, the testator devised certain
lands to his wife during her widowhood, and after her marriage or
death, to his wife's heirs by consanguinity with the exception of one of
her sisters. The testator died in May, and when his will was probated
in the same month, his wife dissented therefrom. The following August
the widow remarried to one Flora and shortly thereafter a posthumous
child of the testator was born to her. Within six months this child, the
only offspring of the testator, died and a few months after its death the
testator's wife had another child, the issue of her marriage with Flora.
This second child brought ejectment to recover the lands from an heir
ex parte paterna of the testator's posthumous child. Held, (1) that the
plaintiff could not claim as heir of the deceased child because he was
not of the blood of the testato" from whom the deceased child had de-
rived the property ;21 (2) that, even if the devise to the wife's heirs was
contingent at first, still the plaintiff, claiming as purchaser under the
will, could not take as one of the remaindermen because the particular
estate of the wife, whether determined by her dissent to the will or by
her marriage, did not continue to his birth, and consequently his con-
tingent remainder would have been defeated.
The Flora case is notable because, curiously enough, we find in it a
double inconsistency on the part of the court in applying the rule of de-
structibility. Although the first child was not actually born until three
months after the destruction of the particular estate, yet since he was
en ventre sa mrre at that time, his apparently contingent remainder was
treated as vested and of course not subject to the rule of destructibility.
Without the aid of any statute2 our court followed this important ex-
ception to the rule of destructibility as laid down by the House of Lords
in the case of Reeve v. Lon. 23 Professor Simes, speaking of that case
(in which a son, posthumously born six months after the death of his
father, the life tenant, was allowed to take) says: "The case is obviously
illogical if one accepts the doctrine that the seisin must pass to the re-
mainderman without a gap."'2 4 With regard, however, to the second son
of the wife who was not born until after the termination of the particu-
lar estate, our court applied inexorably the rule of destructibility.
"Accord: Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284 (1884).
1035 N. C. 344.
See N. C. CODE ANiN. (Michie, 1935) §1654, Rule 4.
See N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1654, Rule 7, which provides for the
vesting of an estate by inheritance in an heir born within ten lunar months after
the death of its ancestor.
13 Lev. 408 (1694).
1 SimEs, FuTuRE INTRESTS (1936) §103.
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Another interesting case has been found in which the North Caro-
lina court preserved from destruction a remainder which it had appar-
ently regarded as contingent. In Beddard v. Harrington25 a testator
devised a tract of land to his wife "for and during her natural life or
widowhood," then to his granddaughter in fee simple "after the death
of my said wife." After the testator's death his widow remarried, and
thereupon his granddaughter claimed the right to immediate possession
of the land given her by the will. The widow, asserting a right to the
land for the rest of her natural life, brought suit against the grand-
daughter to have the will construed. The court held that the widow,
who had remarried, could not maintain an action to recover possession,
since she had held only a life estate determinable either upon her death
or remarriage. As to the granddaughter the court said, in part: "The
devise to the granddaughter, the defendant, 'after the death of my said
wife', can not take effect until that event.... After the remarriage of the
widow, until the devise to the granddaughter is to take effect, i.e., at the
death of the widow, the realty would go to the heirs at law of the de-
visor for such interval and the granddaughter would be entitled in that
capacity as sole heir, unless there were others, in which event she would
be tenant in common till the death of the widow, when she would be-
come sole owner under the terms of the devise." No authority was
cited by the court for this position. While no reference is made to con-
tingent remainders, it is obvious that the court regarded the death of the
testator's wife as a condition precedent to the granddaughter's taking
any interest under the terms of the will. This construction, in effect,
would give the granddaughter a contingent remainder in the same tract
of land in which the widow took a life estate determinable upon her
death or remarriage. When the preceding estate of freehold was termi-
nated by the widow's remarriage, the remainder had not yet become
vested* since the contingency upon which, it was to vest-the widow's
death-had not occurred. Here was a gap in the seisin and the stage
was set for the court to apply the rule of destructibility to defeat the
contingent remainder of the granddaughter. But, instead, it did a
strange thing: it preserved the remainder. Apparently without sensing
that the situation called for an application of the rule, the court held that
during the interval in which the devise could not take effect the realty
should go to the heirs of the testator, with the granddaughter, if she
were his sole heir, taking as an heir until the death of the widow, when
the granddaughter would become sole owner as purchaser under the
terms of the devise. This means that the court without statutory aid
preserved from destruction an apparently obvious contingent remainder
-124 N. C. 51, 32 S. E. 377 (1899).
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by allowing it, in a blinking uncomprehending fashion, to take effect as
an executory devise operating under the law of wills analogously to a
springing use under the Statute of Uses. Of course, if the grand-
daughter's freehold interest were treated as an executory devise, it could
take effect in the future regardless of the termination of the preceding
limitation to the widow; and, sinc6 testamentary dispositions are not
subject to the requirement of livery of seisin, the abeyance-of-seisin
problem would be solved by regarding the seisin as being in the testa-
tor's heirs during the interval while the widow remained alive.26 Also,
executory devises have long since been held indestructible.2 7
It may be conceded that the North Carolina court in the Beddard
case effectuated the intention of the testator and thus attained a desir-
able result; but in order to reach that result the court treated a con-
tingent remainder as an executory interest (hence giving it an inde-
structible quality) and thus ran counter not only to the settled English
common law rule on the subject but also to a prior North Carolina
decision which had accepted the English doctrine. In the leading Eng-
lish case of Purefoy v. Rogers28 Lord Hale set forth a rule to the ef-
fect that, "where a contingency is limited to depend on an estate of free-
hold which is capable of supporting a remainder, it shall never be con-
strued as an executory devise, but a contingent remainder only, and not
otherwise." And in the case of Watson v. Smith,2 decided seven years
before the Beddard case, we find the North Carolina court stating the
same rule in these words: "An executory devise is strictly such a limita-
tion of a future estate or interest in lands as the law admits in the case
of a will, though contrary to the rules in limitations in conveyances at
common law, but it is never construed to be such if it is possible that it
should take effect as a remainder."3 0 The effect of this rule was that if
by will a contingent remainder supported by a particular estate of free-
hold were created, then such contingent remainder must take effect ac-
cording to the rules of the common law governing its vesting and con-
sequently its destructibility, and it could not be salvaged beyond the
time set for its vesting by being labeled an executory devise. It will
be readily seen that our court ignored this rule in deciding the Beddard
case when it let the contingent remainder, which had failed to vest
during the preceding particular estate or by the time it terminated, sur-
vive as an executory devise. No mention was made either of the Eng-
See 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §160.
Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590 (1620).
S2 Win. Saunders 380, 2 Lev. 39 (1670).
110 N. C. 6, 14 S. E. 640 (1892).
It should be pointed out, however, that Watson v. Smith, supra note 29,
dealt not with the question of destructibility, but with the problem of construing a
limitation by way of remainder on a contingency with a double aspect.
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lish authorities or of the Watson case, nor does the court refer to the
doctrine of destructibility.
Our court could have easily avoided being placed in the awkward and
embarrassing situation just described by construing the words, "after
the death of my said wife," as being merely conditional in form and not
as adding a condition to the vesting of the remainder. In other words,
as suggested by Professor Simes, "the-testator probably meant to limit
the remainder to take effect either on A's (the wife's) death or upon
the sooner determination of A's estate by marriage or otherwise."'3 This
being so, the granddaughter's remainder could have been construed as
being vested32 and ready to take effect in possession upon the remar-
riage of the testator's widow. Such a result would have been in accord
not only with the leading English case of Lux ford v. Cheeke3 but also
with the American authorities3 4 which have passed upon a similar
problem.
Since the North Carolina court did not explain the result it reached
in the Beddard case on any technical, legal basis, it must remain a mat-
ter of conjecture as to whether it consciously rejected the rule of de-
structibility or failed to apply it through sheer oversight.
By Premature Destruction of Preceding Freehold
1. By tortious alienation-feoffment, fine, or common recovery.
According to Kent: "Estates for life were, by the common law, liable
to forfeiture. . . by alienation in fee. Such an alienation, according to
the law of feuds, amounted to a renunciation of the feudal relation, and
worked a forfeiture of the vassal's estate to the person entitled to the
inheritance in reversion or remainder. Alienation by feoffment, with
livery of seisin, or by matter of record, as by fine or recovery, of a
greater estate than the tenant for life was entitled to, by devesting the
seisin and turning the estate of the rightful owner into a right of entry,
operated as a forfeiture of the life estate, unless the person in remainder
or reversion was a party to the assurance."3 5 This premature destruc-
tion of the life estate by the tortious alienation of the holder thereof also
had the effect of destroying a contingent remainder limited to take effect
a"1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §74.
'See Gillespie v. Allison, 115 N. C. 542, 20 S. E. 627 (1894) in which the
court held that a remainder dependent upon the termination of an estate durante
viduitate is a vested and not a contingent remainder.
'3 Lev. 125 (1683).
"Gibson v. Land, 27 Ala. 117 (1855); De Vitto v. Harvey, 262 Ill. 66, 104
N. E. 168 (1914) ; Klingman v. Gilbert, 90 Kan. 545, 135 Pac. 682 (1913) ; Mad-
dox v. Yoe, 121 Md. 288, 88 Atl. 225 (1913); Ferson v. Dodge, 23 Pick. 287
(Mass. 1839).
14 KENT's COMm. (12th ed. 1873) **82-83, 84.
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immediately after the life estate but which had not become vested at the
time of the forfeiture.3 6
It seems clear that in North Carolina today contingent remainders
can not be destroyed by the life tenant's tortious alienation-and conse-
quent forfeiture-of his particular estate. Fines and recoveries as
modes of conveyance were never used in this state. 7 .Feoffments with
livery seem to have become obsolete with the passage of a law in 171588
which dispensed with livery of seisin and substituted registration of the
deed in lieu thereof.3 9 Indeed, only one case has been found in which the
subject of forfeiture by alienation was discussed and that case did not
involve the destruction of a remainder. 40 Apparently all conveyances of
land today in North Carolina operate innocently under the Statute of
Uses41 to convey only the grantor's interest and therefore occasion no
forfeiture 4 2
2. By forfeiture-(a) for treason or other crime.
There is a possibility that at common law the contingent remainder
might be destroyed by the forfeiture of the life estate as a result of the
treason or other crime of the tenant thereof. Professor Simes states
that "Fearne discusses the possible effect of forfeiture for treason, but
gives us nothing conclusive on the point.143 No such basis for the de-
struction of contingent remainders could arise in North Carolina because
it is expressly provided in the Constitution that, "No conviction of
treason or attainder shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture.144
Another section45 of the Constitution effectually excludes forfeiture as
By feoffment: Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66 b (1597); Snelling v. Lamar,
32 S. C. 72, 10 S. E. 825 (1889). By fine: Doe d. Willis v. Martin, 4 Term P,
39 (1790). Accord: Boulmight v. Brown, 16 S. C. 155 (1881). By common re-
covery: Loddington v. Rime, 1 Salk. 224 (1695); Waddell v. Rattew, 5 Rawle
231 (Pa. 1835).
' So stated in the preamble of a statute passed in 1715 and published as Chap-
ter 3 of 1 PorrnR's REvisAL (1821).
11 PorrT's Rnv., c. 6 (1821).
'Hogan v. Strayhorn, 65 N. C. 279, 283 (1871). In Savage v. Lee, 90 N. C.
320, 324 (1884) the court declared that "livery of seisin was abolished by our act
of 1715."
"Doe on d. of Taylor v. Shufford, 11 N. C. 116, 129 (1825).
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1740.
'In Wilder v. Ireland, 53 N. C. 85, 90 (1860) the court, in an appended note,
said that "all the conveyances of land, adopted and used in this State, are based
on and take effect by, the operation of that statute" (the Statute of Uses). See
also, Hogan v. Strayhorn, 65 N. C. 279, 284 (1871), wherein the court said: "After
the act of 1715 ... deeds of bargain and sale, and of covenants to stand seized,
have answered every purpose."
1 SIsas, FUtrURE INTERESTS (1936) §100, citing FEARNE, CONTINGENT IR-
MAINDERS (1845) 282, 283, also, Roe v. Davis, 1 Yeates 332, 342, 343 (Pa. 1794).
"N. C. CONST. (1868) art. IV, §5. See also White v. Fort, 10 N. C. 251, 264
(1824), in which it was held that forfeiture for felony, which was the established
rule at common law, has had no force in this state since 1778.
"N. C. CoNsT. (1868) art. XI, §1.
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a punishment for any crime, since it provides that: "The following pun-
ishments only shall be known to the laws of this state, viz.; death, im-
prisonment with or without hard labor, fines, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit
under this state."
2. By forfeiture-(b) for waste.
The old English Statutes of Marlbridge46 and of Gloucester,47 which
respectively, provided that the person guilty of waste should be amerced
in damages or should forfeit the place (vasted and pay treble damages,
have, with some qualifications, been embodied in the law of North Caro-
lina.48 Our present law provides that "an action [of waste] lies in the
Superior Court at the instance of him in whom the right is, against all
persons committing the waste, as well tenant for term of life as ten-
ant for term of years and guardians," 49 and that "the judgment may be
for damages, forfeiture of the estate of the party offending, and evic-
tion from the premises."50 "When judgment is against the defendant,
the court may give judgment for treble the amount of the damages as-
sessed by the jury, and also that the plaintiff recover the place wasted,
if the damages are not paid on or before a day named in the judg-
ment."51 What effect should the forfeiture, under these statutes, by the
life tenant for waste have upon the rights of the contingent remainder-
man whose interest has'not become vested at the time of the forfeiture?
Although no decision bearing directly on the point has been found, at
least in two cases it has been intimated by way of dicta that the contin-
gent remainder might be destroyed. 52 Such a result would logically fol-
low if the rationale of the destructibility rule were strictly adhered to in
such a situation."
Let us examine the North Carolina statutes relating to forfeiture for
waste in order to determine whether, in their practical operation, a
situation calling for the application of the rule of destructibility might
possibly be presented. The proper approach to the problem would seem
to lie in the ascertainment of the person who, under the statute, would
' 52 Hen. III, c. 23 (1267). '6 Edw. I, c. 5 (1278).
IN. C. Cow- ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§888-893.
,Id. §889. - Id. §888.
"Id. §893. Our court has construed this section to mean that the judgment
for the Place wasted must be conditional, and can take effect only upon the failure
of the defendant to pay the actual damages before a day certain. So that it is
left in the sound discretion of the judge who tries the action to determine whether
he will give single or treble damages, as well as fix a day after which a writ of
possession may issue for the place wasted, if the damages allowed shall not have
been in the meantime actually paid. Sherrill v. Connor, 107 N. C. 630, 12 S. E.
588 (1890).
'Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C. 1, 9, 16 S. E. 1011 (1893) (reference to waste
omitted in S. E. report of case); Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N. C. 705, 709,
68 S. E. 217, 219 (1910).
'31 SIMES, FurUR INTEzESTS (1936) §100.
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be entitled to institute the action for waste. The statute is very general
on the point: "an action lies in the superior court at the instance of him
in whom the right is .... ,,54 The court, however, in a number of deci-
sions has held that the owner of the first estate of inheritance, either by
way of reversion or vested remainder, may maintain an action for
waste. 5 It is also well settled that the owner of an executory devise or
of a contingent remainder cannot recover damages or ask that a for-
feiture be declared for waste already committed, but is entitled to have
his interest protected from threatened waste or destruction by injunc-
tive relief.56 Suppose then, for illustrative purposes, G by deed has
created an estate in A for life, remainder to B for life if he pay X $100,
remainder to C and his heirs. Or suppose in the illustration just given
no remainder in fee simple had been limited to C, thus leaving a rever-
sion in fee in G. A, the life tenant, commits waste. Would it be pos-
sible under the North Carolina law for C, the. remainderman, or G, the
reversioner, to sue A for waste and obtain a judgment declaring a for-
feiture of A's life estate, which judgment would have the effect of de-
stroying B's contingent remainder (assuming B had not yet paid X
$100) ? It is our belief that the answer to the question would be in the
negative. It is hardly conceivable that our court would permit the plaintiff
in such a suit to avail himself of a statutory remedy and obtain such a
judgment thereunder as would have the effect of destroying the validly
created interest of a person not a party to the suit.57 In all probability
the court in its sound discretion would limit the reversioner or remain-
derman to a recovery of damages for the waste committed by the life
tenant.58
To illustrate the point further: suppose G should create an estate
in A for life, remainder to the children of B who should survive A.
Would it be possible for G or his heirs, claiming the reversion in fee,
pending the vesting of the contingent remainder in B's children, to sue
A for waste, ask that a forfeiture of A's estate be declared, and obtain a
judgment which would have the effect of destroying the contingent re-
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §889.
'Burnett v. Thompson, 51 N. C. 210 (1858) ; Wall v. Williams, 91 N. C. 477
(1884) ; Latham v. Lumber Co., 139 N. C. 8, 51 S. E. 780 (1905) ; Cf. 1 TIFFANY
REAL PRoPmTY (2d ed. 1920) §290 (c). But see Dozier v. Gregory, 46 N. C.
100, 106 (1853) to the effect that an action in the nature of waste might be main-
tamined by a vested remainderman holding only an estate for life or for years.
I Gordon v. Lowther, 75 N. C. 193 (1876) ; Latham v. Lumber Co., 139 N. C.
8, 51 S. E. 780 (1905) ; Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N. C. 705, 68 S. E. 217
(1910).
'Whatever the result, it would seem that under the law a contingent remain-
derman would be a necessary party to the suit. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§§456, 457. The writer is indebted to Dr. A. C. McIntosh, Professor of Law
Emeritus of the University of North Carolina, for helpful suggestions concerning
the procedural aspects of the action of Waste.
' See note 51, mpra.
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mainder of B's children? Again it would seem that the answer should
be, no. In addition to the arguments presented in the preceding para-
graph against such a result, attention is directed to other matters which
would seem to preclude the reversioner from squeezing out the con-
tingent remaindermen. All the authorities seem to agree that the rem-
edy of forfeiture, in all statutes, is given to the owner of an iedefeasi-
bly vested reversion or remainder in fee simple immediately following
an estate for life. 59 The reversion of G, in the illustration given, is not
indefeasibly vested, but vested subject to defeasance by the vesting of
the contingent remainder in fee in B's children. Nor does it immedi-
ately follow the estate for life. Hence it follows that G (or his heirs)
would be precluded from availing himself of the remedy of forfeiture
and would have to be content with injunctive relief against the threat-
ened waste.60 If our conclusions are correct, it would appear by the
process of elimination to be procedurally impossible for any person in
North Carolina to obtain in an action for waste a judgment of forfeiture
which would have the effect of destroying a contingent remainder.
However, the conclusiveness of the foregoing proposition might be
open to question by virtue of certain dicta extant in two North Carolina
cases.61 In Starnes v. Hill H conveyed land to a trustee for the use of
M for life, and in the event R should outlive M then to R for life, and
at the determination of both life estates, then to the heirs of R and their
heirs forever.62 The court held that,.since the remainder to R was sub-
ject to the condition precedent of his outliving M and was therefore
contingent, the Rule in Shelley's Case did not yet apply to give him a
fee simple in remainder so as to permit him to join in a deed with M
to convey an unfettered fee simple in the land to their grantee. It was
pointed out that since the vesting of R's remainder depended upon his
outliving M, his contingent remainder might be totally defeated by the
premature destruction of M's particular estate during her lifetime by
surrender or forfeiture; and, said the court, "It may be observed in
this connection, that waste is still recognized by the laws of this State
as a ground of forfeiture." The case in no particular involved the
problem of waste, nor did the court suggest who, under our law, would
be the proper party to bring the suit which might ultimately result in
the destruction of R's contingent remainder. It is our opinion that the
13 SIMns, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §621. RESTATEMENT, PRoPz'RT (1936)
§199, Comment c: "Thus under all these statutes except'those in terms referring to
future interests 'for life or for years', the person, if any, entitled to claim a statu-
tory forfeiture is the owner of the next immediate indefeasible estate of inherit-
ance and such person only." North Carolina seems to be in line with these au-
thorities. See note 55, supra.
SImES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §622.
"See note 52, supra. - 112 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. 1011 (1893).
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court inserted the dictum as to waste simply to bolster its position that
R's remainder was contingent instead of vested.
The other case, Richardson v. Richardson,6 3 did involve an action
for waste. Testator devised land to his wife for life, "and at her death"
to his grandson, J. R., during his lifetime, and at J. R.'s death to his
children if any were living at his death; but if none, then over to J. R.'s
brothers. r . R. brought suit against the first life tenant not only to re-
cover damages for the waste alleged to have been committed by her but
also to have her life estate forfeited by reason of such act of waste. The
court sustained the judgment of non-suit in favor of the defendant on
the ground that since J. R.'s remainder was contingent upon his sur-
viving the defendant, the first life tenant, J. R.'s only remedy was by
way of injunction.64 However, the court, by way of dictum, pointed out
that if the judgment had been for the forfeiture of the widow's life
estate, then that particular estate would have been determined before
the happening of the event, namely, the death of the widow, upon which
the remainder was to vest in J. R. Said the court: "The widow would
have lost her life estate, as the plaintiff would have recovered the place
wasted by virtue of the statute, but the interest in and the possession of
the land would have vested in him under the judgment of the court de-
daring a forfeiture of the life estate, and not by virtue of the terms of
the will.... If the first life estate is determined by forfeiture, surrender
or otherwise, and the life tenant survives its determination, the re-
mainder can not take effect, by the express words of the will, until the
death of the widow, whereas the imperative rule of law requires that
the remainder must vest, that is, the contingency must happen during
the continuation of the particular estate or eo instanti it determines.
The life estate is destroyed by the forfeiture resulting from the waste
under the statute, and yet the event upon which the plaintiff is to take
his estate in remainder has not happened." Here is a clear statement of
the rule of destructibility with an intimation by the court that, under
some circumstances, the forfeiture of the life estate on account of waste
would destroy a contingent remainder limited thereon. It will be no-
ticed, however, that the court does not permit the contingent remainder-
man, through his own procedural error, to destroy his own interest; nor
does it allow him to accelerate the vesting of his remainder by taking
advantage of the statutory remedy of forfeiture for waste. While the
court does not suggest who would be the proper party to bring the
action, it is a matter of serious doubt whether it would recognize the
right of any party to obtain a forfeiture judgment under the statute
which would have the effect of squeezing out the contingent remainder-
-152 N. C. 705, 68 S. E. 217 (1910).
" See note 56, supra.
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man. In other words, if the contingent remainderman could not avail
himself of the statutory remedy for his benefit, should any one else be
permitted to take advantage of it to such remainderman's detriment?
One further word remains to be said in connection with the Richard-
son case. It is believed that the court was in error in holding that the
remainder of I. R. was contingent. The property was devised to the
widow for life, "and at her death" to go to J. R. during his lifetime. It
is a well settled, rule that a limitation will not be construed as creating a
contingent remainder if it can possibly be construed as creating a vested
one.65 And where an estate is limited to A for life, an "on", "at",
"from", "after", or "in the event of" A's death, to B, such words are
construed to refer to the time when B may take possession of his estate
and are not regarded as conditions precedent to the vesting of his in-
terest. His remainder is therefore regarded as vested and not con-
tingent.66 This rule of construction is generally accepted in North
Carolina. 67 If the court in the Richardson case had followed its own
decisions6" in which it had construed language almost identical with that
involved in the Richardson case, it logically would have been forced to
hold that the remainder devised to J. R. was vested, and the problem of
destructibility would never have arisen.
No cases have been found in other jurisdictions where contingent
remainders were destroyed by the forfeiture of the supporting life es-
tate under the waste statutes.6 9 In view of this total absence of prece-
dent and in the face of the procedural difficulties presented by our stat-
ute, we believe that the North Carolina court, despite the dicta in the
two cases just discussed, would hesitate to be the first to extend the
harsh and unjust doctrine of destructibility to a case to which it has
never before been applied.7 0
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPFIiTY (2d ed. 1920) §138.
01Ibid.
'In Carolina Power Co. v. Haywood, 186 N. C. 313, 319, 119 S. E. 500, 503(1923) the court said: "One of the prevailing rules of construction is that ad-
verbs of time, or adverbial clauses designating time, do not create a contingency
in a devise, but merely denote the time when the enjoyment of the estate shall
commence." The court cited a number of North Carolina cases in support of the
statement.
'McNeely v. McNeely, 82 N. C. 183 (1880) (Devise to B "at the death of his
mother": Held, B took a vested remainder); Ellwood v. Plummer, 78 N. C. 392(1878) (Land was devised to 0 in trust for two of T's daughters during their
natural life, and, after the death of either, in trust for T's three grandchildren
until the death of the other daughter "at which time" the land was to be divided
among the three grandchildren of whom P was one: Held, P took a vested re-
mainder. Accord: Harris v. Russell, 124 N. C. 547, 32 S. E. 958 (1899); King
v. Stokes, 125 N. C. 514, 34 S. E. 641 (1899) ; and other cases cited in Carolina
Power Co. v. Haywood, supra, note 67.
1 1 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §100.
70 Ibid.
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2. By forfeiture-(c) for failure to pay taxes.
Only three states, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Ohio, have pro-
vided by statute71 for the forfeiture of the life estate by the owner
thereof who, by failing to pay taxes assessed thereon, has been remiss in
protecting the subsequent interests in the land. Would such forfeiture,
resulting in the premature failure of the life estate, have the effect of
destroying the interest held by a contingent remainderman in the same
land? By strict logic the rule of destructibility should be applied if the
remainder had not become vested at the time the life estate fell in. No
cases have been found either in North Carolina or in Arkansas and
Ohio in which contingent remainders were involved where forfeitures
under the statutes took place. At the risk of not letting sleeping dogs
lie, let us investigate the possibilities under the North Carolina law.
Our statute7 2 provides that the life tenant shall forfeit his estate to the
remainderman or reversioner when he suffers it *to be sold for taxes
by reason of his neglect or refusal to pay the taxes, and fails to redeem
the property within a year after the sale; and that such remainderman
or reversioner may also recover damages from the life tenant for his
failure or refusal to pay the taxes. The remainderman or reversioner is
also given the right to redeem the land after it is sold. It is obvious that
this statute was passed to protect the holder of the future interest, since
under our present law the property itself is sold at the tax sale and not
simply the interest of the delinquent.73 In construing this statute our
court has held that the payment of the taxes by the reversioner or re-
mainderman is not a condition precedent to the institution of his action
against the life tenant for forfeiture ;74 nor does he have to wait until
there is a sale for taxes or until the foreclosure of the tax-sale certifi-
cate to institute his action for forfeiture, but may intervene before the
sale and pay the taxes and sue to recover the amount expended therefor
from the life tenant together with any damages accruing by virtue of
the life tenant's failure or refusal to pay the taxes.7Y5 In all the decided
cases the parties availing themselves of the statutory remedy of for-
feiture were vested remaindermen whose estates immediately followed
the life estate of the delinquent taxpayer. Suppose, however, the re-
mainder had been contingent, for example: X to A for life, remainder
in fee to such children of B as shall survive A. A fails to pay the
taxes. What may the remaindermen do? The statute makes no pro-
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7982; ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &.
Moses, 1921) §10054; GEN. OHIO CODE (1930) §5688.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7982.
I Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. C. 314, 51 S. E. 889 (1905).
" Bryan v. Bryan, 206 N. C. 464, 174 S. E. 269 (1934).
Smith v. Miller, 158 N. C. 98, 73 S. E. 118 (1911) ; Sibly v. Townsend, 206
N. C. 648, 175 S. E. 107 (1934).
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vision for contingent remaindermen, as such, and the many questions
pertaining to their remedies are left unanswered. In the case just
stated, we do not believe that the living children of B could sue for the
forfeiture of A's life estate if the result of such an action would be to
accelerate the vesting of the remainder.7 6 Several possible remedies
might be suggested of which the contingent remaindermen might avail
themselves: (1) pay the taxes due on the land and sue the life tenant
for reimbursement 77-- the docketed judgment therefor constituting a
lien on the life tenant's interest; (2) obtain a mandatory injunction
compelling the life tenant to pay the taxes.78 Could X, the reversioner
in the hypothetical case, bring an action under our statute against the
delinquent life tenant for forfeiture of the latter's estate and obtain a
judgment therefor which would effectually destroy the contingent re-
mainder of B's children by removing prematurely its freehold support?
Since the statute Was enacted primarily for the protection of the holders
of future interests in the land, we do not believe that our court would
sanction the activity of any one of them which would have the back-
firing effect of destroying the validly created interest of any other.79 The
same reasoning could be employed if B held an intervening contingent
remainder for life, and C, a vested remainderman in fee, should sue A
to have his life estate declared forfeit for A's failure to pay taxes. It
remains a question of serious doubt whether, in the first place, the
statutory remedy of forfeiture would be available to either the rever-
sioner or the remainderman in such instances. We think that our court,
in the absence of any guiding precedent, would be loath to invoke the
doctrine of destructibility in this, another situation where it has never
before been applied.
2. By forfeiture-(d) for contesting a will.
Our discussion thus far has been predicated on the assumption that
the doctrine of destructibility has not been, either by statute or by judi-
cial decision, declared officially extinct in North Carolina. The com-
paratively recent case of Corl v. CorY0 while it raises grave doubts as
to the continued existence of the doctrine in this state, still leaves the
" Compare our discussion of the Richardson case, supra note 64, in the analo-
gous situation where forfeiture for waste was involved.
7' That such a remedy is available to the contingent remainderman may per-
haps be inferred from a statement by the court ipa Riggsbee v. Brogden, 209 N. C.
510, 513, 184 S. E. 24, 26 (1936) that there is a "duty resting upon the life tenant
to keep the property free from tax liens so that it may pass to the remainderman
unencumbered by such liens."
"See RESTATEmENT, PRoPERTY (1936) §189 (1)(b).
" Compare the situation where, under N. C. CODE AN T. (Michie, 1935) §1744,
a life tenant is permitted to bring suit for the sale of land which has become so
unproductive the income therefrom will not pay the taxes, and in which suit the
interests of contingent remaindermen are adequately protected. Cf. Stepp v. Stepp,
200 N. C. 237, 156 S. E. 804 (1930).
°209 N. C. 7, 182 S. E. 725 (1935).
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matter somewhat open to question, The case is unusual in that the
problem of the destructibility of contingent remainders was raised when
the life tenant contested the will creating the various interests and
thereby brought about a premature destruction of the supporting free-
hold estate.
In the Corl case the testator devised lands and money to a trustee
in trust for his son B for life, and in the event he should marry and have
legitimate children, remainder after his death to said children; but
should he die without leaving legitimate children, then to his nearest
blood relatives in fee simple, discharged from any trust. The testator
further provided that if any of his children or other beneficiary under
the will should contest the will, the person so contesting should forfeit
"all beneficial interest in the estate," which should then go to another
son G in fee simple, discharged from any trust. B contested the will,
and, upon G's suit to have B's interest forfeited, the trial court rendered
judgment that G was entitled to the land in fee simple, discharged from
any trust or remainders; and that he was the owner of all money and
other personalty, freed from any trust. Upon appeal by the defend-
ants, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and
held that B's life estate only was forfeited to G who took the same dis-
charged of any trust, and that the contingent remainders were not de-
stroyed.
An examination of the court's opinion will reveal the fact that it
"failed to explain the exact grounds for preserving the remainders" and
that, as a consequence, "the future effect of the decision is problemati-
cal.""" The case is of sufficient importance to warrant liberal quotation
from the opinion. Said the court: "Does the forfeiture of all of
[B's] beneficial interest in his father's estate destroy the contingent in-
terests limited after his life estate? The court below was of opinion
that the inquiry should be answered in the affirmative. The law is
otherwise. Note, Ann. Cas., 1917 A, 902 et seq.; 23 R. C. L., 560, 561.
True, at the early common law it was said that every remainder re-
quires a particular estate to support it, and a contingent remainder must
vest during the continuance of the particular estate, or eo instanti that
it determines.... The determination of the particular estate, therefore,
by surrender, merger, tortious alienation, forfeiture, or otherwise, prior
to the happening of the contingency upon which the remaindermen
could take, would defeat the remainder for want of a particular estate
to support it.... The rule was of feudal origin, based on the philosophy
of feoffment, livery of seizin, etc .... But with the invention of interven-
ing estates to trustees to preserve contingent remainders .... and later
See an excellent comment on the case in (1936) 4 DUKE B. A. J. 108, 109.
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by statute .... the law of conveyancing underwent quite a change in
England, and much of the prior learning on the subject was confined
to simple deeds or became obsolete." The general language just quoted
is all that was said by the court on the subject of destructibility of con-
tingent remainders. The court devoted the rest of its opinion to a con-
struction of the testator's intent as to what B and G, respectively, should
receive under the will. Despite the language of the will to the effect
that all forfeited interests should go to G "in fee simple discharged of
any trust," the court said, "The intention of the testator was to take
from any beneficiary, who should contest the validity of his will, the
interest intended for him or her thereunder, and to give such interest to
[G]. . . .discharged from any trust previously created in the will for
the benefit of any who should contest the validity of the will." A care-
ful reading of the opinion will not disclose whether the court intended
to abrogate with finality the doctrine of destructibility in its application
to all situations, nor will it indicate the exact basis upon which the con-
tingent remainders in the instant case were preserved.
'While it is true that the language of the opinion, in its broad im-
plications, might be construed to show an intention on the part of the
court to repudiate entirely the rule of destructibility, it is not altogether
clear that the court entertained such an intention. Even though it could
be said that it repudiated the doctrine as it applied to the facts of the
case at hand, the court in no way refers to or expressly overrules the
two early North Carolina cases of Chessun v. Smith8 2 and Flora v.
Wilson83 in which the rule was invoked to destroy contingent remain-
ders which had not vested before the natural termination of the par-
ticular estate. The only two North Carolina cases8 4 referred to in the
opinion were cited: the one, in support of the court's statement of the
common law rule of destructibility; the other, to show the inapplica-
bility of the Rule in Shelley's Case to a situation where the life tenant
took an equitable estate and a legal remainder was given to the heirs of
her body. Moreover, in answer to the general proposition that the for-
feiture of B's life estate destroyed the contingent interests limited
thereon, the court stated, "The law is otherwise," but cited in support of
its statement two general authorities8 5 which merely collect the cases
describing the various methods by which contingent remainders were
destructible, together with some of the statutory modifications of the
rule.
May we suggest, briefly, some of the ways in which the court in the
I See note 17, supra. ' See note 20, supra.
"Carolina Power Co. v. Haywood, 186 N. C. 313, 119 S. E. 500 (1923) ; Payne
v. Sale, 22 N. C. 455 (1839).
'Note Ann. Cas., 1917 A 902 et seq.; 23 R. C. L. 560-61.
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Corl case might have entirely avoided any conflict with the destructi-
bility rule. (1) Since the will set up a trust estate, the court might have
construed the remainder to B's children as an equitable contingent re-
mainder. As such, it would not be destructible since the legal title and
seisin would be in the trustee after, as well as before, the forfeiture of
B's life estate and consequently, there would be no "gap" in the seisin.8
The opinion of the court tends to indicate that it actually, but uncon-
sciously, achieved such a result since it held that the son, G, took the
estate forfeited by B "discharged of any trust previously created for
the benefit of any who should contest the validity of the will"-the in-
ference being that the trust was preserved for the benefit of B's chil-
dren, the contingent remaindermen. (2) We agree with the suggestion
offered by the commentator in the Duke Bar Association Journal that 8 7
"In sympathy with a tendency to regard conditions subsequent on the
particular estate as special limitations, the court might have interpreted
the limitation over as a special limitation, so that G would have had a
vested life estate in remainder which would support the contingent re-
mainders."88 (3) Or, on the basis of common law principles, it might
be argued that, since a conveyance by B of his life estate would not de-
feat the contingent remainder,8 9 then the court's construction of the
limitation in the will, which had the effect of shifting to G the same in-
terest B could have conveyed to him, should result in the preservation
and not the destruction of the remainder. In either case there would
still be adequate freehold support for the contingent remainder since G
would have an estate for the life of B immediately preceding the remain-
der. An argument might reasonably be advanced that the failure of the
court to avail itself of any of these possible solutions of the problem was
indicative of that tribunal's desire to pronounce officially dead in this
jurisdiction the rule of destructibility.9"
It is a matter of regret that the court did not make itself absolutely
clear on the subject, and that it did not take advantage of the oppor-
tunity it had to reject boldly an obsolete doctrine, which by virtue of
statutes and judicial decisions no longer has any existence in twenty-
two jurisdictions and which in five more states has been excluded at
least to a substantial degree.9 '
Astley v. Micklethrwait, 15 Ch. D. 59 (1880) ; Abbiss v. Burney, 17 Ch. D.
21 (1881); 1 SImEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS (1936) §105.
' See note 81, supra.
I Citing, 1 SiMEs, FuTuRn INTERESTS (1936) §166. See also 1 FEARNE, CON-
TINGENT REMAINDERS (1845) 272.
1 BL. CoMM. (Jones' ed., 1916) 940 n.
See (1936) 4 DUKE B. A. J. 108, 109.
For a collection of the statutes and decisions affecting the destructibility of
contingent remainders, see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, EXPLANATORY NOTES (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1935) §282, at pp. 193-196. See POWELL, CASES ON FuTruR INTERESTS
(2d ed. 1937) 635-637, for a note on Statutory Enachients Concerning the Ex-
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A dictum in the case of Lancaster v. Lancaster,2 decided a year and
a half later than the Corl case, casts considerable doubt upon whether
or not the court in the Corl case intended to eradicate completely the
doctrine of destructibility. In the Lancaster case, which involved the
right of a contingent remainderman to take under a will, there appeared
in the opinion the following: "The respondent contends: 'If a contin-
gent remainder becomes impossible of vesting because of the determina-
tion of the life estate before the contingency upon which the remainder
was limited has happened-i.e., if the contingent remainder had perished
it is the same as if it never existed. .. .' The above principle is ordi-
narily true,93 but not applicable here." The court thus apparently gives
some intimation that it still countenances the destructibility rule.
3 and 4. By merger-by surrender or otherwise.
According to Blackstone: "Whenever a greater estate and a less
coincide and meet in one and the same person without any intermediate
estate, the less is immediately annihilated; or, in the law phrase, it is
said to be merged, that is, sunk or drowned in the greater." 94 Since a
contingent interest is not deemed to be an estate, the operation of the
law of merger would have the effect of destroying contingent remain-
ders.9 5 For example: suppose T should devise lands to a married woman
for life, remainder in fee to her son if one should be born. The rever-
sioner in fee (the heir of T) before the birth of a son conveys, by release,
his reversion to the married woman. Her life estate would merge with
the fee simple released to her and the son's contingent remainder would
be destroyed because the life estate supporting it would cease to exist.00
The same result would follow in the converse case, that is, if the tenant
of the particular estate should surrender his estate to the reversioner in
fee or to a vested remainderman in fee.9 7 Or, suppose T should devise
land to A for life, contingent remainder to B and his heirs. T dies and A,
his only heir, inherits the reversion in fee. A could subsequently con-
vey his life estate and reversion to C and thus destroy by the doctrine
of merger B's contingent remainder.98
What is the situation in North Carolina with reference to the de-
struction of contingent remainders by the operation of the merger doc-
trine? Only two cases have been found which might furnish any clue to
the answer.
tinguishability of Contingent Remainders; and note (1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 408
for a discussion of the statutes and decisions eliminating or modifying the de-
sfructibility of contingent remainders.
"209 N. C. 673, 676, 184 S. E. 527, 529 (1936).
Italics ours. 1' 2 BL. COMM. 177.
"1 SImEs, FuTuRE IsTE~msrs (1936) §102.
"Accord: Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Win. Saunders 380 (1670).
"7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORy OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 109.
'Accord: Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931).
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In King v. Rhew9 9 land was conveyed to R and his heirs in trust
for C during her life, and at her death to be equally divided among any
children she might leave her surviving, born of her marriage with her
present husband. In a suit brought by C's children, after C's death,
against the defendant who claimed the land by adverse possession under
color of title under the defectively executed deed of C and her husband,
the court ruled adversely to the plaintiffs on the ground that the statute
of limitations having run against the legal title of R, the trustee, the
interest of the contingent remainderman as well as that of the life
tenant was consequently barred. Although not necessary to the decision
of the case the court by way of dictum said: "Although the plaintiffs
may not have been in existence at the time of the execution of the con-
veyance, the limitation could have been made by a deed (operating as
a common law conveyance) directly to the wife, the inheritance during
the contingency being either, as the old writers say, in abeyance or
in nubibus or, according to Mr. Fearne, remaining in the grantor until
the ascertainment of the persons who are entitled to take. Under such
a conveyance, however, . . . the contingent limitations over could have
been defeated by the destruction of the life estate." From this dictum
it could possibly be inferred that a merger, operating either by way of
release of the grantor's fee to the life tenant or by virtue of the life
tenant's surrender of her interest to the grantor, would have been recog-
nized by the court as a means of effectively destroying the contingent
remainder.
The problem was more squarely presented in the case of Winslow
v. Speight.100 In that case the testatrix devised certain land to her
two sons, F and J, for their lives, "and, should they or either of them
die without issue, then in that case the interests of them both, or the
interest of either one, shall revert back to my (testatrix's) nearest or
living kin." The eighth item in the will provided: "My will and desire
is that all the residue of my estate, if any, taking out the devises and
legacies above mentioned, shall be equally divided among my three
children." (A third child, also provided for in the will, died before
this suit arose and her interests are not involved in the controversy.)
The two sons, one of whom was unmarried and had no issue, the other
of whom had three children, contracted to convey the land to the plain-
tiff and tendered him a fee simple deed therefor, but plaintiff refused
the deed on the ground that the title was defective, and sued the sons
to recover the option money which was to be returned if the title proved
to be defective. The sons contended that, since the reversion in fee des-
108 N. C. 696, 13 S. E. 174 (1891).
100187 N. C. 248, 121 S. E. 529 (1924).
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cended to the testatrix's three children pending the happening of the
events upon which the estate given over was to take effect, the convey-
ance to the plaintiff of the life estate and the reversion merged the life
estate into the reversion and destroyed the contingent remainder to the
testatrix's nearest or living kin. Although the court recognized the
existence of the destructibility doctrine, it refused to allow its applica-
tion in this case where on the same facts under the English common
law the merger contended for by the defendants would have had the
effect of destroying the contingent remainder. This being so, it might
well be argued that the case represents a definite narrowing of the de-
structibility rule by our court by the elimination of merger as a destruc-
tive agent.
The court, in the Speight case, in holding that the two sons, the
defendants, could not give an indefeasible fee simple title to the land,
reached that conclusion upon a construction of the entire will to the
effect that whatever interest the sons took in the land, they acquired
it under the will and not, in any respect, by descent from their mother.
Item eight of the will quoted in the preceding paragraph was the
determining factor in such construction. The court reasoned that if,
under the item of the will which gave the land to the two sons with
limitations over, the married son should predecease his brother and the
surviving brother should die without issue, then the latter's interest
would go to the testatrix's nearest or living kin who would necessarily
be other than the parties purporting to convey to the plaintiff. Ob-
viously, the court was refusing to allow the. doctrine of merger to up-
set what it conceived to be the decedent's testamentary scheme. Had
the decision in this case been adverse to the plaintiff, then it would
have followed that the defendants, in a subsequent equity suit, would
have been entitled to a decree of specific performance of plaintiff's
contract to buy the land, albeit the perfection of the vendor's title
would have depended upon the destruction by merger of a contingent
remainder. Perhaps the North Carolina court, in deciding the instant
case, foresaw such a possibility, and thus shared with other authorities
the view that since the destruction of contingent remainders "is regarded
as an unconscionable transaction, equity will not encourage it."
'10 1
While perhaps it cannot be dogmatically said that the Speight case
removes, beyond the possibility of doubt, merger as an agent operating
effectively to destroy contingent remainders in North Carolina, yet
11 Sims, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §107. Cf. Redfern v. Middleton's Ex-
ecutors, 1 Rice 459 (S. C. 1839) ; Bentham v. Smith, 1 Cheves Eq. 33 (S. C. 1840).
In these cases the South Carolina court refused to grant specific performance of
contracts to convey land where the perfection of the vendors' titles depended upon
the destruction of contingent remainders by tortious feoffments.
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from the decision one senses a rather definite feeling of hostility on the
part of the court toward so ungracious a doctrine.10 2
5. By disseisin of, or adverse possession against, the life tenant.
Suppose land has been conveyed to A for life, remainder in fee to
B's eldest son who is yet unborn. X possesses the land adversely against
A for the statutory period of limitation so that A's right of action to
recover the land is effectively barred, and his original life estate is
thereby destroyed. Does this premature excision of A's life estate
destroy also the contingent remainder of B's son, which at that time
had not yet become vested? No case dealing with the problem has been
found in North Carolina, and there is a paucity of decisions thereon
in other jurisdictions. However, let us examine, briefly, some of the
possibilities.
At common law, according to Fearne :1o3 "If A be tenant for life
with contingent remainder over, and tenant for life be disseised, all
the estates are divested; but the right of entry of tenant for life will
support the contingent remainders; but in this case, if the contingent
remainder does not vest before such a descent be cast as will take away
the entry of tenant for life within the statute of H. 8, c. 33, and drive
him to his action, then is the contingent remainder gone; because
there no longer subsists any right of entry to support it, that right
being turned into a right of action." This means that when, by the
death of the disseisor, or by any other means, the right of entry under
a previous estate is lost, there is no longer a rightful estate capable of
supporting a contingent remainder.1 0 4 However, under the modern law
of adverse possession the person dispossessed is generally deemed to
be the owner of the land until the statute of limitations runs.10 5 This
is true under the North Carolina statutes. -0 6 And even though we grant
that the original life estate of A is destroyed and at an end when the
statute has run against him, it has been consistently held that the statute
does not run against the holder of any future interest until the normal
termination of the life estate, when the future interest becomes posses-
sory30 7 Nor may the owner of the reversion in fee after the contingent
remainder make entry, as may be inferred from Fearne's statement
quoted above, to squeeze out the contingent remainderman.10 s Pro-
a" A strong decision against the destructibility of contingent remainders by
merger was rendered in McCreary v. Coggeshall, 74 S. C. 42, 53 S. E. 978 (1906),
in which case the fact situation was somewhat similar to that of the Speight case.
"I1 FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (1845) 288.
Id. at 286, n. e.
I SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §101.
"' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§428, 430, 446.
1 SimEs, FuTURE INTERESTS (1936) §776; Brown v. Brown, 168 N. C. 4,
84 S. E. 25 (1915).1
"Kales, Adverse Possession Against Reversioners and Rentainderlien (1919)
14 ILL. L. REv. 564, 565, 583.
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fessor Kales argues, further, that if the disseisor of the life tenant, A,
were held to acquire a new title for the life of A, this freehold should
serve adequately to preserve from destruction the contingent remain-
der. 10 9 It would seem, therefore, that under the American authorities,
including North Carolina, the disseisin of the life tenant resulting pre-
maturely in the loss of his interest before his death would not destroy
the contingent remainder dependent upon the life estate. Sed quaere
as to the result, if the remainder has not yet vested when the life tenant
dies.
We again call attention to the case of King v. Rhew,n °O discussed
above in connection with the doctrine of merger, in which the North
Carolina court held that the acquisition of title by an adverse possessor
against a trustee destroyed not only the interest of the life tenant but
also that of the contingent remaindermen. It will be readily seen that
this case did not involve the destructibility doctrine as such, but pro-
ceeded on the well-recognized theory, as stated by Professor Simes,
that: "For purposes of an action to recover the possession of land, the
trustee represents the beneficiary, and his failure to sue binds the
beneficiary.""'
6. By life tenant's renunciation of his interest.
Suppose a testator devises land to A for life, remainder in fee to
the children of the testator who shall survive A. A renounces and
refuses to take his life estate, or A, being the testator's widow, dissents
from the will and elects to take her dower intead of the testamentary
provision made for her. How would the renunciation of the life
estate affect the contingent remainder dependent for support upon such
freehold? If we arbitrarily say that renunciation, like forfeiture, termi-
nates the already effective life estate before the contingent remainder
has vested, then, under the rule of destructibility, the remainder would
fail and the reversioner would take the seisin in fee. By a dictum in
the early case of Flora v. Wilson,11 preViously discussed in this article,
the North Carolina court intimated that it might take a position that
would lead to such a result. It suggested in that case that if the particu-
lar estate given the widow by the will were prematurely determined by
her dissent from the will, the contingent remainder dependent upon the
life estate would thereby be defeated. Later decisions, however, indi-
cate that the court would now take a different position in the matter.
For instance, in Young v. Harris"s a testator devised certain land to
trustees for the benefit of the testator's wife during her widowhood, and
if she should ever remarry, the trustees were directed to distribute the
'
1*Id. at 144. " See note 99, supra.
13 SimEs, FUTuRE INTEREsTs (1936) §786.
' See note 20, supra. - 176 N. C. 631, 97 S. E. 609 (1918).
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property among the testator's next of kin "who would be entitled to
the same at law." Shortly after the testator's death his widow dis-
sented from the will and elected to take her dower. The question arose
as to whether J, who was at that time the testator's next of kin and only
heir at law, could by his deed convey an indefeasible fee simple title to
the land. The court, without any mention of the doctrine of destruc-
tibility, held that the widow's dissent had accelerated 's remainder and
had vested in him complete title to the land subject only to the widow's
dower. Although the court realized that perhaps T's remainder was a
vested one under the rule that the ascertainment of the "next of kin"
normally would be referable to the death of the testator, it said: "But
conceding this to be otherwise in the present instance, not only is there
nothing in the will that forbids the application of the principle of ac-
celeration... but it is clear from a perusal of the instrument that...
the entire purpose in putting this estate in the hands of the trustees
was to insure the proper maintenance of the testator's widow while she
remained unmarried or until she died without having remarried, and
that the distribution among the ultimate takers was only postponed in
order the better to effect the primary purpose; and this purpose and the
preceding interest conferred on the widow having been entirely removed
by her dissent, the ultimate takers come into the immediate enjoy-
ment of their rights to the extent that the same creates no interference
with the interests which the law has conferred upon the widow."
What would seem to be the effect of this decision? Our court has
already definitely held that, by a widow's dissent from her husband's
will giving her a life estate, the vested remainder in the will was ac-
celerated; and that the will, in so far as provision therein was made
for the widow, operated in the same manner as to the time of enjoy-
ment by those entitled after her death, as if she had died prior to her
husband.'1 4 In other words the remainderman, on this construction,
takes by executory devise as if there had never been any life estate.
The YouVa case, citing a number of vested remainder cases, seems to
go further and hold, in effect, that a contingent remainder would be
accelerated and would take effect in possession as an executory devise
when the widow dissented even though the condition precedent to the
remainder's vesting had not actually been fulfilled. Thus, the court, as
indicated by the portion of the opinion quoted above, is giving effect
to the testator's intent merely to postpone the remainderman's enjoy-
ment of his interest for the benefit of the widow's preceding life estate.
By such a construction the court departs from the inflexible rule of
destructibility and preserves remainders which otherwise might have
"'Baptist Female University v. Borden, 132 N. C. 476, 44 S. E. 47, 1007
(1903); Wilson v. Stafford, 60 N. C. 646 (1864).
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been destroyed. Should the question be squarely presented the court
would not want for authority to support its dictum in the Young case
that contingent remainders are accelerated and not destroyed by the
widow's renunciation of her life estate.1 1 5
No case has been found in this state where the question of destruc-
tibility was raised as a result of an ordinary life tenant's renunciation
of his interest before the remainder vested. We suggest that, should
such a case arise, the court could easily avoid application of the de-
structibility rule (certainly in a testamentary situation) by treating the
renounced life estate as if it had never been created and then, reason-
ing from the anology either of the widow's dissent cases or of the
lapsed devise cases,116 give effect to the contingent remainder as an
executory devise if and when the condition precedent is fulfilled.
STATUTES
We shall now give brief" consideration to some North Carolina
statutes with reference to any bearing they might have indirectly on
the problem of destructibility. At the beginning of this article we
pointed out that this state has not enacted any legislation expressly
preserving from destruction contingent remainders.
By our statute of descentsllr any person born within ten lunar
months after the death of his ancestor is deemed to be in being for
inheritance purposes; hence if a contingent remainderman is begotten
but not born when the particular estate terminates, his remainder is
regarded as vested and not, therefore, subject to the rule of destruc-
tibility. This statute buttresses the same proposition already arrived
at 'by a judicial decision11 8 rendered without statutory guidance.
At common law if Blackacre were conveyed to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of B, a living person, and if B outlived A, the contingent
remainder to B's heirs would fail, for the reason that since no one is
the heir of a living person, there would be no ascertained person entitled
to take the seisin at the termination of the particular estate.1 19 The
chances for the destruction of a contingent remainder on such a basis
have been considerably lessened by virtue of a statute1 20 which pro-
' Scotten v. Moore, 5 Boyce 545, 93 AtI. 373 (Del. 1914) ; Fox v. Rumery, 68
Me. 121 (1878), cited in the Young case; Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373, 118
At. 850 (1922); Christian v. Wilson's Ex'rs, 153 Va. 614, 151 S. E. 300 (1930).
. "' See Simmons v. Gooding, 40 N. C. 382, 389 (1848). "It is settled law, that
where a particular estate is given by will with a remainder over, whether vested
or contingent, the remainder takes effect notwithstanding the particular estate
fails by the death of the person for whom it was intended, before the death of the
testator."
u N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1654, Rule 7.
'Flora v. Wilson, 35 N. C. 344 (1852), discussed in the first part of this
article.
n92 BL. CoMm. 170.
22N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1739.
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vides that: "A limitation by deed, will, or other writing, to the heirs
of a living person, shall be construed to be to the children of such
person unless a contrary intention appear by the deed or will." If a
child is born to B any time during A's lifetime, under the statute the
remainder immediately becomes vested in that child subject to being
opened up to let other children of B born during A's lifetime share
therein.
At this point incidental mention might be made of two North
Carolina statutes, which, although they in no way involve the common
law rule of destructibility as discussed in this article, operate so as to
affect seriously the rights of a contingent remainderman in a particular
tract of land. One of them2'2 provides that lands, in which there is a
vested interest with a contingent remainder over either to persons not
in being or to those who have not yet satisfied the condition precedent
to the vesting of their interests, may by proper proceedings in court be
sold or mortgaged for reinvestment or improvement purposes. While
the contingent remainderman, by virtue of such sale or mortgage, may
lose his rights in the particular tract of land involved, the statute im-
presses upon the fund derived from the sale or mortgage the same
contingencies and limitations as were imposed upon the original prop-
erty.12 2 This statute facilitates the alienation of lands in which con-
tingent future interests are held and at the same time affords adequate
protection to the owners of such interests.
The other statute123 permits the grantor or settlor in a voluntary
deed or trust to revoke, by proper instrument, any future contingent
interest limited therein to persons not in esse or to those whose interest
cannot be determined until the happening of some future event, pro-
vided ilhat such revocation takes place prior to the happening of the
contingency which would precipitate the vesting of the future estates.
In 1715 the legislature of North Carolina passed a statute which
is still effective law today, and which reads, in part, as follows: "All
deeds executed and registered according to law shall be valid, and pass
title and estates without livery of seizin, attornment or other cere-
mony."' 2 4 Although the point has never been raised, we believe that
this statute, in view of our court's construction of it, should play an
extremely significant part in the determination of the existence of the
destructibility doctrine in this state.
In Savage v. Lee' 25 the question was raised as to whether or not
a grantor could, after reserving a life estate for himself, create a valid
-Id. §1744.
'For the operative effect of this statute, see Springs v. Scott, 132 N. C. 548,
44 S. E. 116 (1903).
" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §996.
Id. §3308. - 90 N. C. 320 (1884).
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freehold estate in another person, such interest not to take effect in
possession until the grantor's death. It was contended that the deed
was void because it conveyed an estate of freehold to commence in
futuro. It was held that the deed, operating under the Statute of
Uses as a good bargain and sale, was effective to convey a future free-
hold estate to the grantee. In the opinion appeared the following signifi-
cant language: "But independently of the statute of uses, we can see
no reason why a deed in this state may not have the effect of passing
a freehold estate in futuro. The reason why it could not be done at
common law arose from the necessity of livery of seizin; but livery of
seizin was abolished by our act of 1715, which declared that all deeds
. . .registered . . . 'shall be valid and pass estates in land, without
livery of seizin, attornment or other ceremony whatever.' Ratione
cessante, cessat et lex. The object of this statute.., 'is to dispense with
the ceremony of livery of seizin, to substitute registration of the deed in
lieu thereof, and to allow title to be passed by the deed. .... ,125" It
has also been held that all registered deeds of bargain and sale and
covenants to stand seized to uses have been put on the same footing
with feoffments at common law, with respect to seisin, the declaration
of uses thereon, and consideration.1 26
As we have already pointed out, the doctrine of destructibility of
contingent remainders had its origin in the two theories: (1) that there
could be no gap in the seisin; and (2) that livery of seisin, being a
presently operative mode of. conveyance, an estate of freehold could
not thereby be created to take effect in the future. Since the feudal
requirement that someone always be seised of the land to prevent a
gap in the seisin never existed in North Carolina; and since livery of
seisin, as a mode of conveyance, has been abolished in this state; and
since, independently of the Statute of Uses, a registered deed may have
the effect of creating a freehold estate in futuro, it would seem to
follow that all the common law bases upon which the destruction of
contingent remainders was predicated have been removed. The reason
for the rule having ceased, the rule itself ought to become extinct.
But what if the deed is unregistered? Our court has held that a
deed is good and valid as between the parties thereto without registra-
tion,127 and that the title vests, as against the grantor and all others
except creditors and purchasers for value, from the delivery of the
deed.1 2 8  Here again, we would argue that a contingent remainder,
even though created by an unregistered deed, should be held inde-
" Id. at 324.
"Rowland v. Rowland, 93 N. C. 214 (1885).
"Weston v. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 263, 75 S. E. 800 (1912).
'Warren v. Williford, 148 N. C. 474, 62 S. E. 697 (1908).
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structible since the title to the land passes by the delivery of the deed
and not by the obsolete and outlawed delivery of the seisin.
By way of fortifying our position we call attention to the fact that
the Kansas court in Miller v. Miller129 repudiated the destructibility
doctrine by a similar construction of the Kansas statute, which was
worded in essentially the same language as our statute.
SUMMARY
As a result of our research, we find that although North Carolina
has recognized the rule of destructibility it has not squarely applied it
except in two early cases; that the court preserved the contingent
remainder in one case where the rule, if applied, would have warranted
the remainder's destruction; that contingent remainders can no longer
be destroyed by the forfeiture of the life tenant's interest by reason of
his tortious alienation or commission of crime; that it is doubtful if
the life tenant's forfeiture for waste or failure to pay taxes would defeat
the contingent remainder; that our court refused to recognize merger as
an agent of destruction in a case where, at common law, the merger
would have operated to defeat the remainder; that the situation where
the life tenant loses his estate by adverse possession has not ever been
passed upon; that the court has strongly indicated that it would pre-
serve contingent remainders from destruction where the life tenant has
renounced his interest; that in the Corl case, decided in 1935, the court
in general language repudiated the doctrine of destructibility but left the
matter open to question by failing to indicate the exact basis upon which
it preserved the contingent remainders; and, finally, that by one statute
a contingent remainder to a begotten but unborn child is made inde-
structible, and that by virtue of another statute abolishing livery of
seisin, it could reasonably 'be argued that the common law rationale upon
which the rule of destructibility is predicated no longer exists in this
state.
It is a matter of no little wonder that in a state where the destruc-
tibility rule has so long obtained so few cases invoking the rule have
been found. One can only conjecture that this paucity of decisions is
perhaps attributable to: (1) the employment of the conveyancing device
of trustees to preserve contingent remainders,8 0 or (2) the ignorance
of lawyers as to the operation of the rule of destructibility, or (3) the
unwillingness of the legal profession to invoke the rule.
' 91 Kan. 1, 136 Pac. 953 (1913).
'That this device is not unknown in North Carolina, see King v. Rhew, 108
N. C. 696, 13 S. E. 174 (1891); Cameron v. Hicks, 141 N. C. 21, 53 S. E. 728
(1906).
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CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the situation with reference to the destructibility
of contingent remainders in North Carolina, not for the purpose of
breathing the breath of life into a moribund doctrine, but for the pur-
pose of showing such confusion and uncertainty in the law regarding
the existence of the doctrine as would call for remedial legislation to
settle the matter. The rule of destructibility, as a relic of the Middle
Ages based on the feudal concept of seisin and of the transfer thereof,
is a useless anachronism in our property law of today and should
definitely be excised therefrom. Arbitrarily applied, the rule, in nearly
every case, defeats the intention of the grantor or testator. The trend
of judicial decisions and legislative enactments indicates a definite
animosity to the continued existence of the rule. It was entirely elimi-
nated in England by legislation in 1844, 1845 and 1877.131 We have
already pointed out that in America the rule has been eliminated either
wholly or in part by legislation enacted in twenty-seven states.13 2 In
three jurisdictions the doctrine has been rejected by judicial decision.133
The Property Restatement, in line with modem trends, announces that
"when a remainder is subject to a condition precedent, the termination,
before such condition precedent is fulfilled, of all prior interests created
simultaneously therewith does not destroy the remainder". 3 4
Shall we-to paraphrase the language of a court of common pleas of
Pennsylvania-retain in North Carolina this unjust relic of feudalism
when it is being abandoned everywhere?'3r We suggest that North
Carolina, by statutory enactment, visit a merciful death upon the doc-
trine of destructibility and forever put an end to its crippled and con-
fused wanderings through our real property law. This statutory eutha-
nasia could very well take the form of an act suggested by Professor
Kales, as follows:
"No remainder or other interest shall be defeated by the determi-
nation of, the precedent estate or interest prior to the happening
of the event or contingency on which the remainder or expectant
interest is limited to take effect, and any rule which requires a future
interest which by possibility may take effect as a remainder to do so
or fail entirely is hereby abolished."' 36
' 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106; 40 & 41 Vict. c. 33.
" See note 91, mupra.
'Godfrey v. Rowland, 16 Hawaii 377 (1905); Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan. 1,
136 Pac. 953 (1913) (with the aid of a statute authorizing the creation of estates
to commence in the future); Haywood v. Spaulding, 75 N. H. 92, 71 Atl. 219
(1908).
"'2 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1936) §240.
"See Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. 309, 313, 20 Atl. 1002 (1891) (The At. re-
port of this case does not contain -the language referred to.)
"'KALEs, ESTATES AND FUTuRE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920) §106.
